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Residential Privacy and Free Speech:
Competing Interests in Charitable
Solicitation Regulation
Fraternal Order of Police, North Dakota State Lodge v. Stenehjem'
I. INTRODUCTION
"For charity shall cover the multitude of sins."2
"Charity creates a multitude of sins."3
Although these two quotations represent society's mixed feelings toward
charity, they also represent a distinction people often make between a char-
ity's aims and its means. Charitable organizations have the potential to spread
hope, re-allocate societal resources, and advocate societal values. How they
go about accomplishing these noble goals, however, is sometimes the subject
of public frustration and annoyance. This creates a tension between admiring
the charity's philanthropy and becoming irritated with the means used to
achieve it.
Undoubtedly, one of the most unwelcome guests in any household is a
telemarketer. In fact, 98% of 1.78 million respondents to a recent online sur-
vey said telemarketing calls made them "angry."4 Because of this, many
states have enacted laws regulating charities' use of telemarketing as a means
to further their message.
5
While public sentiment seems to support heavy regulation of telemar-
keters, regulating charitable solicitation presents interesting and unique prob-
lems. Charitable solicitation receives full First Amendment protection, so any
state legislature attempting to regulate charitable solicitation must respect
charities' free speech rights.6 In examining these laws, courts must also care-
1. 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005).
2. 1 Peter 4:8 (King James).
3. Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism, in THE ANNOTATED OscAR
WILDE 398 (H. Montgomery Hyde ed., 1982).
4. See http://www.dianamey.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (follow "Tele-
marketing Statistics" hyperlink). Diana Mey has gained notoriety for leading a cam-
paign against telemarketers, and was named one of People Magazine's most intrigu-
ing people of 1999.
5. See e.g., C.R.S. § 6-16-103 (2002); C.G.S.A. § 21a-190h (1994); GA. CODE
ANN. § 43-17-3 to 43-17-7 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51: 1905 (2003); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28-b (2004).
6. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1980).
1
Wilbers: Wilbers: Residential Privacy and Free Speech
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
fully delineate the boundaries between a state's power to protect its residents'
privacy and the charities' First Amendment right to advance its message.
As demonstrated in Fraternal Order of Police, North Dakota State
Lodge v. Stenehjem, drawing this line between First Amendment rights and
residential privacy is a difficult task, particularly in light of prior Supreme
Court decisions muddying the water. Ultimately, when such weighty values
collide, lower courts need particularized guidance to assist with their deci-
sions. This Note argues that Stenehjem was wrongly decided, and that its
misguided analysis reflects the uncertainty in this area of the law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The North Dakota statute at issue in Stenehjem prohibited certain solici-
tations of residents registered with the state's "do not call" list.7 The statute
permitted "in house" solicitations by charitable organizations, but prohibited
calls made by professional soliciting organizations on behalf of charitable
organizations.8 Additionally, to be permitted, the statute required that the
caller make certain disclosures at the onset of the call, including the caller's
name, as well as the name, address and phone number of the charitable or-
ganization.9
In Stenehjem, the plaintiffs were charitable organizations who "rel[ied]
on professional charitable solicitors for their fundraising."' 0 The plaintiffs
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-01 (1999); Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State
Lodge v. Stenebjem, 431 F.3d 591,596 (8th Cir. 2005).
8. See id. at 596. Specifically, the act excluded calls made by charitable organi-
zations from the definition of "telephone solicitation" in limited circumstances. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 51-28-01.7.c(1) to (2) (1999).
9. Id. The act also defined "telephone solicitation" as not including calls
made to subscribers with the subscriber's written permission or consent, calls made
for the purpose of conducting a telephone poll, calls made by political organizations,
and calls by salespeople not intending to complete a transaction over the phone but at
arranged "face-to-face" meetings. Id. at 7.a., 7.d-7.f.; see also Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at
596 n.2. The act itself only applied to telephone "solicitations," so charitable organi-
zations could hire an outside agency to make calls on its behalf to simply advocate the
organization's message. See id. at 596.
10. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs were the Fraternal Order of Police, North Da-
kota State Lodge and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Id. at 591. Furthermore, their
petition was supported by amicus curiae briefs from several states, including: Indiana,
Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae for States of Indiana et al. in Support of Appellant Wayne Stenehjem, Fraternal
Order of Police v. Stenehjem, No. 03-03848 (8th Cir. 2003), 2003 WL 23912560.
1178 [Vol-. 71
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argued that the entire statute was unconstitutional because the distinctions it
drew were content-based."l
The United Stated District Court for the District of North Dakota stated
that the statute regulated two types of speech: commercial and charitable.' 2 In
addressing the commercial speech regulations, the court applied a less rigor-
ous standard of review' 3 and held that the statute's regulations were constitu-
tional because there was a reasonable fit between the law and the harms the
legislature sought to prevent. 4 The court explained that charitable speech, on
the other hand, "'is fully protected by the First Amendment."" 5 The district
court concluded that, since the government was attempting to preserve resi-
dential privacy and prevent fraud, the statute's distinction between charitable
and commercial solicitors prohibited "more speech than the evil [it was] tar-
geting," which rendered the statute content-based and therefore unconstitu-
tional. 16
The Eighth Circuit disagreed for two reasons. 17 First, the court noted
that the statute's distinction was not made "because of any disagreement with
the message that would be conveyed, for the message would be identical re-
gardless of who conveyed it."'18 Second, the law was justified without refer-
ence to the content of the speech because the state has a compelling interest in
"protecting residential privacy." 19
IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The seemingly simple language that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech" has spawned two centuries of court deci-
sions that struggle to delineate the exact parameters of this First Amendment
11. See Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 596. Generally, a facial challenge to a statute
seeks "to vindicate not only [their] rights, but also those of others who may also be
adversely impacted by the statute in question." 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 113
12. Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1026-28 (D.N.D. 2003).
13. Id. at 1026. The court explained that "[tihe Constitution 'accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-
sion."' Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980)).
14. Id. at 1028. The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge these provisions because they were not commercial speakers and because
"the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech." Id. at 1026, 1028,
15. Id. at 1028 (quoting Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Ark., Inc. v. Pryor, 258
F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2001)).
16. Id.
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right.2° Courts do not protect all types of expression equally; some types of
speech receive less protection, 21 while others receive no First Amendment
protection at all.22 In addition, courts do not protect any type of speech abso-
lutely.23 Competing interests may require the government to restrict expres-
sion in certain situations.24 However, in determining the appropriate balance
between First Amendment rights and competing interests, courts often look to
the type of speech involved and the legitimacy of the competing interest.
25
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution therefore accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-
sion.").
22. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding
statute that prohibited using "[d]erisive or annoying word[s]" in public because
regulating fighting words does not infringe on the speaker's freedom of speech
when the state's interest is preserving public peace); see also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (invalidating criminal syndicalism act because
it punished "mere advocacy" of violence - which is constitutionally protected
speech - as opposed to incitement of violence, which is not constitutionally pro-
tected); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (establishing ob-
scenity test and noting that "obscene material is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment.").
23. See, e.g., U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the idea that
"the freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes all
modes of communication of ideas by conduct."); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (stating that "no one has a right to press even 'good'
ideas on an unwilling recipient," and that people need not be "captives" to objec-
tionable speech); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1988) (noting
that the "standards by which limitations on speech must be evaluated" differ ac-
cording to the nature of the forum - either "the traditional public forum, the pub-
lic forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum").
24. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562-64 ("The
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both
of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.").
See also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (1968) (holding that "because of the Gover-
ment's substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selec-
tive Service certificates," the prohibition on burning draft cards was constitu-
tional even though it was symbolic expression). In addition, courts have used
other factors to determine the appropriate balance between free expression and
competing government interests, such as where the expression takes place, see
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479 ('To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on pro-
tected speech, we have often focused on the 'place' of that speech, considering
the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ."); and the entity expressing
itself, see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ("The Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage cer-
1180 [Vol. 71
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/16
CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
Essentially, Stenehjem pitted charitable solicitation, a type of expres-
sion, against residential privacy, a compelling state interest.26 The Supreme
Court has addressed both of these issues in previous cases.
A. Residential Privacy
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the validity of a person's
right to "be left alone," or right to not have unwelcome messages thrust upon
her.27 While the parameters of this right vary depending on the situation, the
Court has made clear that this right is strongest when the unwilling recipient
is in her home.28
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a postal service law that required mail so-
licitors to stop all future mailings to a particular household upon the resi-
dent's request.29 Although the Court recognized the fundamental importance
of the free exchange of ideas, it also reasoned that "the right of every person
'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to com-
municate." 30 Balancing those interests, the Court recognized that the "pleth-
ora of mass mailings" had become increasingly frustrating for residents
whose mail consisted mostly of "material [they] did not seek from persons
[they did] not know.",31 Because the "ancient concept that 'a man's home is
his castle' ... has lost none of its vitality," the Court held that "the mailer's
right to communicate [was] circumscribed only by... the addressee giving
notice that he wishes [to receive] no further mailings from that mailer." 32
After tipping the scales in favor of residential privacy, the Court noted that
the statute presented "no constitutional obstacles" because Congress was not
regulating the mailer's speech.33 Rather, the law merely permitted "a citizen
to erect a wall - that no advertiser may penetrate without his acquies-
cence."
34
tain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.").
26. Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 598
(8th Cir. 2005) (stating that the North Dakota "no call list" was "[s]eeking to balance
the interest of callers against the privacy rights of subscribers").
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
29. 397 U.S. 728, 729 (1970). The challenged law was Title IH of the Postal
Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967. Id.
30. Id. at 736.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 737.
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The Supreme Court has also protected the interest of residential privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Carey v. Brown, the Court addressed an
Illinois statute that prohibited picketing around residences, but included an
exception for labor-picketing. 35 Although the Court noted that "the Illinois
statute regulates expressive conduct that falls within the First Amendment's
preserve," it anal zed the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause. 6
The Court conceded that "[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one
retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of
their daily pursuits, is surely an important value." 37 Ultimately, however, the
Court invalidated the statute because "even the most legitimate goal may not
be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner." 38 The primary
problem with the statute at issue in Carey was that it "ma[de] no attempt to
distinguish among various sorts of nonlabor picketing on the basis of the
harms they would inflict on the privacy interest." 39 The Court summarized
that the "overinclusiveness and under inclusiveness" of the statute under-
mined Illinois' claim that it was "maintaining domestic tranquility.
' 40
The Supreme Court has used Carey's discussion of residential privacy
and guidelines for appropriate regulations to further that interest in several
First Amendment cases.
In Frisby v. Schultz, the Supreme Court reviewed an ordinance that pro-
hibited any person from picketing before or about the residence or dwelling
41of any individual. Since the ordinance prohibited picketing that took place
solely in front of a particular residence, the Court noted that, to be valid, the
ordinance must "serve a significant government interest and.. . leave[ ] open
ample alternative channels of communication."
42
Quoting Carey, the Court noted that the "'State's interest in protecting
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest
order in a free and civilized society. -43 The Court explained that an "impor-
tant aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener," and
that the usual rule of requiring listeners "simply to avoid speech they do not
want to hear" is inapplicable when the listener is at home.44 After finding that
the government had a significant interest in preventing residents from being
"captives" in the "sanctuary of the[ir] home[s]," the Court held that the ordi-
35. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
36. Id. at 459-60; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
37. Carey, 447 U.S. at 471.
38. Id. at 464-65.
39. Id. at 465.
40. Id.
41. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
42. Id. at 482-83.
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nance was narrowly tailored.45 Ultimately, the Court found that the statute's
complete ban was narrowly tailored because each activity within the statute's
scope was an "appropriately targeted evil."4 6
B. Charitable Solicitation
The Supreme Court has addressed First Amendment protection of chari-
table solicitation in a number of cases. The seminal case discussing charitable
solicitation is Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
decided in 1980.
47
In Schaumburg, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to a
Chicago suburb's soliciting ordinance.4 8 Specifically, the ordinance required
charitable organizations to obtain a permit before employing "door-to-door
solicitation or the use of public streets and public ways" to solicit.49 To obtain
a permit, the applying organization had to show "[satisfactory] proof that at
least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solicitations w[ould] be
used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization."
50
Schaumburg's ordinance was aimed at "protect[ing] its residents from
fraud and the disruption of privacy," an admittedly "legitimate interest.
' 51
Regulating charitable solicitation, however, "must be done with narrow speci-
ficity." 52 The Supreme Court explained that "charitable appeals for funds...
involve a variety of speech interests" and, therefore, are within the protection
of the First Amendment.53 "[C]haritable solicitation," the Court continued,
"does more than inform private economic decisions. . . [and therefore] it has
not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.
54
Schaumburg argued that its ordinance was narrowly tailored to protect
charitable speech "because any charity is free to propagate its views from
45. Id. at 484-86.
46. Id. at 485-86. The statute challenged in Frisby only barred picketing that was
"narrowly directed at the household, not the public." Id. at 486. Because that picket-
ing "inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy," the Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the ordinance violated their First Amendment rights. Id.
47. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
48. Id. at 622-23.
49. Id. at 623.
50. Id. at 624 (first alteration in original).
51. Id. at 627.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 632.
54. Id. Interestingly, although the Court elevates charitable solicitation above
commercial speech and states that charitable solicitations are within the protections of
the First Amendment, it stops short of declaring strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard of review. Id. at 637. In declaring the appropriate standard, the Court de-
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door to door in the Village without a permit as long as it refrains from solicit-
ing money., 55 The Court summarily rejected this argument because it
"fail[ed] to perceive any substantial relationship between the 75-percent re-
quirement and the protection of public safety or of residential privacy.
56
Further, the Court argued that there was "no indication" that organizations not
meeting the requirement would be "any more likely to employ solicitors who
would be a threat to public safety" than those meeting the requirement. 57 In
fact, the Court noted that the opposite may be true, as "organizations employ-
ing paid solicitors carefully screened in advance may be even less of a threat
to public safety than solicitation by organizations using volunteers."5 8 While
the Court conceded that the ordinance would reduce the total number of so-
licitors, it found that this goal could be also be accomplished by "any prohibi-
tion on solicitation," and that "[t]he ordinance is not directed to the unique
privacy interests of persons residing in their homes ... ,59 As such, the Court
concluded that the ordinance was "unconstitutionally overbroad. 6 °
Relying heavily on Schaumburg, the Court has more specifically ad-
dressed regulations of professionals who solicit funds on behalf of charities in
subsequent cases. In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., a professional fundraiser challenged a Maryland statute restricting
agreements between charities and professional solicitors. 6 1 Specifically, the
statute prohibited charities from paying more than 25% of the total solicited
funds as compensation for professional solicitors.62 Although the statute al-
lowed exemptions in limited circumstances, each contract between a profes-
sional solicitor and a charity had to be filed with the Secretary of State
"within ten days after it [was] entered into and prior to any solicitations.' 63
The issue for the Supreme Court was "whether the distinctions between
the Schaumburg ordinance and the Maryland statute [were] sufficient to ren-
der the statute constitutionally acceptable." 64 After discussing the legitimate
interest of the Schaumburg ordinance, the Court noted that the Maryland stat-
ute was flawed because there was no "connection between the percentage
55. Id. at 628.
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 638 n.13.
59. Id. at 638.
60. Id. at 639.
61. 467 U.S. 947, 950 (1984).
62. Id. This limitation did "not apply to compensation or expenses paid by a
charitable organization to a professional fund-raiser counsel for conducting feasibility
studies for the purpose of determining whether or not the charitable organization
should undertake a fund-raising activity." Id.
63. Id. at 950-52 (noting that the Secretary of State can permit a charity to pay
more than the statutory limitation "where the 25% limitation would effectively pre-
vent the charitable organization from raising contributions").
64. Id. at 959.
1184 [Vol. 71
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limitation and the protection of public safety or residential privacy." 65 Mary-
land pointed out that the main difference between its statute and Schaum-
burg's ordinance was the inclusion of an administrative waiver, which argua-
bly prevented the Maryland statute from being too rigid.66 The Court dis-
agreed with Maryland and concluded that, "regardless of the waiver provi-
sion, Schaumburg requires that the percentage limitation in the Maryland
statute be rejected. 67
Four years after Munson, the Court decided Riley v. National Federation
of the Blind of North Carolina, which addressed a North Carolina law regu-
lating charitable solicitation by professionals in a more general manner.68 The
statute prohibited professional solicitors from collecting an "unreasonable" or
"excessive" fee, as defined by a three-tiered schedule using percentages to
mark each tier.69 The statute also required professional solicitors to obtain an
approved license and to disclose their name, the name of their employer, and
the average percent of solicitations actually turned over to charities by their
employer within the previous year before soliciting any funds.
70
North Carolina distinguished its percentage-based portion of the statute
from those at issue in Schaumburg and Munson in two ways. 71 First, in addi-
tion to the motives articulated in the prior two cases, its statute was designed
to ensure "that the maximum amount of funds reach the charity. ' 72 Second,
its statute was more flexible than those at issue in the prior cases, thus making
it more narrowly tailored.7 3 The Court rejected the first contention for two
reasons. Primarily, it noted that North Carolina's additional motivation was
"little more than a variation of the argument rejected in Schaumburg and
Munson that this provision is simply an economic regulation with no First
Amendment implication. 74 The Court concluded that, even if it were to as-
sume that this motivation was valid, the fact that many charities would "reject
the State's overarching measure" illustrated that the statute was not narrowly
65. Id. at 962 n. 10.
66. Id. at 962-68.
67. Id. at 968.
68. 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (The North Carolina law "defines the prima facie rea-
sonable fee.").
69. Id. at 784-85. A fee "up to 20% of the gross receipts collected is deemed
reasonable." Id. A fee "between 20% and 35% ... [is deemed] unreasonable upon a
showing that the solicitation at issue did not involve the dissemination of information,
discussion, or advocacy relating to public issues as directed by the [charitable organi-
zation] which is to benefit from the solicitation." Id. at 785 (second alteration in
original). Finally, "a fee exceeding 35% is presumed unreasonable, but the fundraiser
may rebut the presumption by showing that the amount of the fee was necessary." Id.
70. Id. at 786.
71. Id. at 789-90.
72. Id. at 789.
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tailored.75 As for the second distinction, the Court noted this justification fails
because of Munson's determination that "there is no nexus between the per-
centage of funds retained... and the likelihood that the solicitation is fraudu-
lent."
,76
Turning its attention to the mandatory disclosure provisions, the Court
found them to be content-based regulation of speech because "[m]andating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content
of the speech. 77 As such, the Court subjected the statute to "exacting First
Amendment scrutiny. '78 The State responded by stressing the importance of
its interest in donor information and transparency in the donation process to
clear up misconceptions. 79 The Court concluded, however, that this was "not
as weighty as the State asserts, and that the means chosen to accomplish it are
unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.,
80
The final step of Riley's analysis addressed the licensing requirement.
81
Here, the Court emphasized that the professional solicitors were not less enti-
tled to First Amendment protection "merely because compensation is re-
ceived. ' 82 The Court concluded that, even if the State's interest in "regulating
those who solicit money" was sufficient, the statute was unconstitutional be-
83
cause it did not specify when a license would be provided. Accordingly, the
Court found that all three provisions were unconstitutional.
84
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified its position in these prior three
cases when it rejected an attempt to use a percentage cap on fees paid to pro-
fessional solicitors. In 2003, the Court decided Illinios, ex. rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,85 where a professional solicitor retained 85%
of all donations collected on behalf of Vietnam veterans, but told residents
that she only retained 10%.8 6 The Court tempered its prior holdings by stating
that they did "not rule out, as supportive of a fraud claim against fundraisers,
any and all reliance on the percentage of charitable donations" retained.87
While charitable solicitation is protected within the First Amendment, the
Court noted, fraud is not.88 Therefore, the Court distinguished Madigan from
its prior trilogy of cases because Madigan's emphasis was on the misleading
75. Id. at 791-92.
76. Id. at 793.
77. Id. at 795.
78. Id. at 798.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 801.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 802.
84. Id. at 803.
85. 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
86. Id. at 607-08.
87. Id. at 606.
88. Id. at 611-12.
[Vol. 711186
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messages that solicitors conveyed, and not "percentage limitations on solici-
tors' fees per se.' 89 For the Court, this distinction prevented the statute in
Madigan from "chill[ing] protected speech." 9
However, the Schaumburg trilogy does not represent the gamut of Su-
preme Court cases discussing solicitation. In U.S. v. Kokinda,9I the Court
faced the regulation of a variety of solicitation and speech interests.92 Specifi-
cally, the U.S. Postal Service regulation prohibited "[s]oliciting alms and
contributions" on postal service property. 93 In discussing the issue, the Court
noted that two different levels of scrutiny apply to government actions.94 A
higher level of scrutiny applies when the government acts in its official law-
making capacity; a lower level applies when the government is acting as a
proprietor, managing its internal operations. 95 Since the regulation at issue
dealt with the government's postal service operations, the lower level of scru-
tiny applied. Because of this lower scrutiny, the Court upheld the regulation
for two reasons.
96
First, the Court noted that the area where solicitation was prohibited was
not a public thoroughfare, but a private means of access from the parking lot
to the post office.9 7 Second, the post office regulation was grounded in history
and experience and solicitation along the means of access to the post office
could potentially slow the mail.98 Specifically, the Court pointed out that "so-
licitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal Service's business" because "it
has the potentiality for evoking highly personal and subjective reactions." 99
Because of these emotions and potential for conflicts that could impede the
89. Id. at 619.
90. Id.
91. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). It is important to note that Kokinda did not produce a
majority opinion, but a plurality, a concurrence, and a dissent. Id.
92. Id. at 723 ("[V]olunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee.
set up a table on the sidewalk near the entrance of the Bowie, Maryland, Post
Office to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions to the organization's
newspaper, and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues.").
93. Id. at 722-23 (alteration in original).
94. Id. at 725.
95. Id. ("It is a long-settled principle that governmental actions are subject to
a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when 'the governmental function op-
erating... [is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker .... but, rather,
as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation[s] .... ' (alterations and omis-
sions in original)).
96. See id. at 725-26 ("The Government, even when acting in its proprietary
capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints, as
does a private business, but its action is valid in these circumstances unless it is
unreasonable, or, as was said in Lehman, 'arbitrary, capricious, or invidious."').
97. Id. at 727.
98. Id. at 731-32.
99. Id. at 732-33.
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means of access to the post office, the Court held that the regulation was rea-
sonable. 100
C. Eighth Circuit Precedent
Admittedly, the previously discussed Supreme Court cases overlap and
are not restricted to discussing either "residential privacy" or "charitable
speech." Stenehjem provided another example of these competing interests,
although it was not the first time the Eighth Circuit addressed a conflict be-
tween residential privacy and charitable speech. For example, in National
Federation of the Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. Pryor,101 decided before Madi-
gan, the Eighth Circuit addressed charitable solicitation over the phone and
its intrusion on residential privacy.'
0 2
In Pryor, an Arkansas statute required all charitable solicitors to "iden-
tify the caller and the organization on whose behalf the call [was] being
made, state the purpose of the call, and briefly describe any product or service
being offered."10 3 After this introduction, if the resident indicated she no
longer wanted to hear about the charity, the caller was prohibited from offer-
ing additional information. 0 4 The Court cited the Schaumburg trilogy'05 for
the proposition that, since charitable solicitation is fully favored speech, gov-
ernment regulations must serve a "sufficiently strong" interest and be "nar-
rowly drawn" to prevent "unnecessar[y] interfer[ence] with First Amendment
freedoms."'' 6 The Court noted that this standard was similar to time, place,
and manner restrictions.10 7
In applying these principles, the Eighth Circuit relied on Rowan in as-
serting that Arkansas had a legitimate interest in "protect[ing] its citizens
from unwanted telephone calls."'1 8 As for the narrowly tailored means, the
Court rejected the contention that other means, such as unlisted telephone
numbers and caller-IDs defeated the statute.1' 9 Because the statute's "only
impact [was] to end solicitation calls to unwilling residents who otherwise
would not hang up," the Court concluded that the statute passed constitutional
muster.110
100. Id. at 732-34.
101. 258 F.3d 851 (2001).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 854.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text.
106. Pryor, 258 F.3d at 854-55.
107. Id. at 855.
108. Id.
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With this extensive background of both Supreme Court precedent and
Eighth Circuit interpretation of it, the Court addressed the facts of the
Stenehjem case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion"l '
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Eighth Circuit determined
that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message the speech conveys."" 2 As such, incidental burdens on particular
speakers or messages are acceptable as long as the regulation "serves pur-
poses unrelated to the content of expression" and can be "justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."'"
3
After applying these principles to the North Dakota statute at issue, the
majority found the law content neutral for two reasons. 4 First, the majority
stated that the law's distinction "between professional and in-house charitable
solicitors [was not done] because of any disagreement with the message that
would be conveyed, for the message would be identical regardless of who
conveyed it."" 5 Second, the majority reasoned, "the regulation can be justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech," because the
state's interest "is in protecting residential privacy."'
6
The majority acknowledged that "the Act appears to make a subject
matter distinction," but stated that the fact that a law distinguishes between
speech activities in a manner likely to produce the consequences it seeks to
prevent is not, itself, a reason to strike the law for "failure to maintain 'con-
tent neutrality."" 1 7 The court reasoned that the act's restrictions were "not
limited to the ringing of the phone," but to how invasive a phone call may
be.' Ultimately, because solicitation "may reasonably be viewed as more
invasive than advocacy," the act was content neutral."'
After asserting its conclusions, the majority applied the Pryor test,
which is essentially an Eighth Circuit re-formulation of the Supreme Court's
111. Judge Wollman wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Holmes joined.
Stenehjem v. Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State Lodge, 431 F.3d 591, 595-96 (8th
Cir. 2005). Judge Holmes is a District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas who
was sitting by designation for this case. Id. at 595 n. 1.





117. Id. at 596-97.
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Schaumburg test.' 20 This test, the court notes, has been interpreted as "inter-
mediate scrutiny review" and is very similar to time, place and manner re-
strictions. The test involves three steps: "(a) whether the State had a suffi-
cient or 'legitimate' interest; (b) whether the interest identified was 'signifi-
cantly furthered' by a narrowly tailored regulation; and (c) whether the regu-
lation substantially limited charitable solicitations."' 122 The court then applied
these three inquiries to the North Dakota statute at issue.
Citing prior Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the majority
stated it was clear that "residential privacy is a 'significant' government in-
terest, particularly when telemarketing calls 'are flourishing, and becoming a
recurring nuisance by virtue of their quantity." ' 123 Therefore, the court held
that the statute was motivated by a significant interest.
24
Addressing the second step of the analysis constituted the bulk of the
majority's opinion. The majority noted that the narrow tailoring requirement
was satisfied as long as the Act promoted a "'substantial interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation and the means chosen [do]
not burden substantially more speech than is necessary." 1 25 As long as the
act did not foreclose all means of communication, the court continued, "it
may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive
or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal."'126 North Dakota ar-
gued that its distinction between professional and in-house charitable solici-
tors was "based upon the sheer volume of calls," because professional solici-
tors are able to reach many more residents than if the soliciting were done by
the charity itself.
127
The majority also addressed the appellee's argument that the Act was
underinclusive "because a ringing phone disrupts residential privacy whether
the caller is a volunteer or a professional.' ' 128 The majority conceded that
exceptions to an otherwise legitimate speech regulation can "undermine the
government's reasons for the regulation.' ' 129 In this case, however, the court
found that the exceptions fit with the underlying motives for the enactment.
Specifically, the court noted that the Act did not give "one side of a debate"
an advantage over another, but that it did address the overall problem it was
120. See Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 597 citing Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Ark., Inc.
v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 855-56 (1989)).
123. Id. (quoting Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1555 (8th Cir. 1995)).
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1219 (8th Cir.
1998)).
126. Id. at 597-98.
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aimed at - reducing "the total number of unwelcome telephone calls to pri-
vate residences."'
' 30
The court also called attention to the "opt-in" status of the no-call list. 31
Although this status was "not dispositive," the court noted that it "limit[ed]
the degree of government interference with First Amendment interests."' 32 In
completing its second level of analysis, the court concluded that, because the
government had not burdened the speech more than necessary, the act was
narrowly tailored.
133
In its final level of analysis, the court asserted that the act did not sub-
stantially limit charitable solicitations.134 Because the act left open other pos-
sibilities of solicitation such as making "in-house" calls, mailing campaigns,
or in person soliciting, the act left open alternate channels and was, therefore,
not a substantial limit to charitable solicitations. 135
After concluding that the act met all three of Pryor's requirements, the
court dismissed the appellee's argument that the act was overbroad. 136 The
appellees argued that the act was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
made no attempt to distinguish between calls that infringed on residential
privacy and "innocuous speech."' 137 The court disagreed, noting that the act
only applied to residents who register with the no-call list, and therefore,
"[t]he registrants have decided that the Act's banned phone calls intrude on
their residential privacy."' 138 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court




The dissent's position was straight-forward: residential privacy is a le-
gitimate interest, but the Act was unconstitutional because it was not nar-
rowly tailored. 141 The dissent argued that the act substantially limited charita-
ble solicitation and could therefore only be upheld if it served a "sufficiently
strong" government interest and was "narrowly drawn" to serve that inter-
est. 142 Although the dissent "agree[d] that protection from the invasion of
130. Id.
131. Id. at 598-99.






138. Id. at 600.
139. Id.
140. Judge Heaney authored the dissenting opinion.
141. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 600-01 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 600.
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residential privacy by unwanted solicitations is such an interest," it did not
agree that the regulation was narrowly drawn for two reasons.
143
First, the dissent contended that the act was "overly restrictive" because
its broad provisions prohibit professional soliciting "no matter the time of day
nor the percentage of contributions earmarked for the charity."' 144 The restric-
tive nature of the Act, the dissent argued, prevented residents "who are ad-
verse to commercial solicitation but open to charitable solicitation" from
communicating with professional charitable solicitors.
14 5
Second, the dissent argued the act was "underinclusive."' 146 The dissent
explained that a law is underinclusive when it "discriminates against some
speakers but not others without a legitimate neutral justification for doing
so.'
1 47 Noting that both professional and "in-house" solicitors intrude on resi-
dential privacy, the dissent noted that "[i]t remains unclear ... why the gov-
ernment has restricted the charitable speech ... when so many other groups
may intrude upon that privacy."' 148 This undermined the government's ration-
ale for the act, in the dissent's view, because the government offered no sta-
tistical evidence on how the act would "significantly reduce the number of
telephone intrusions into private residences," or that it would "even signifi-
cantly improve[ ] residential privacy."' 149 The dissent concluded that, without
this showing, the act failed the narrowly tailored requirement, therefore ren-
dering it unconstitutional.
V. COMMENT
As previously discussed, there is no lack of Supreme Court decisions
discussing charitable solicitation 150 or residential privacy.' 5' In fact, the Su-
preme Court and Eighth Circuit have addressed cases that pit these interests
against each other.' 52 This precedent has failed to produce a consistent guid-
ing framework, however, and has led to increasing uncertainty and erroneous
decisions.
This comment argues that Stenehjem was wrongly decided for three rea-
sons and that further clarification in this area of the law is needed to resolve
the uncertainty highlighted by the Eighth Circuit's decision. First, the regula-
tion at issue in Stenehjem is arguably content-based, which should warrant
143. Id. at 600-01.





149. Id. at 601-02.
150. See supra Section III.B.
151. See supra Section III.A.
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strict scrutiny review. Although the Eighth Circuit summarily dismissed this
contention, an examination of the issue reveals that this question is closer
than the court assumes. Second, even if the regulation is not content-based,
the court reviewed the regulation under the wrong degree of scrutiny. This
mishap was not intentional, however, because courts have struggled with
determining the appropriate standard of review since Schaumburg. Third, the
court compounded this problem by declaring to apply an intermediate stan-
dard of review, but instead giving legislative deference to North Dakota that
amounts to rational basis review. Because of this deferential review, the court
essentially affirmed the State's arbitrary regulatory distinctions between pro-
fessional solicitors and charitable volunteers without any statistics or studies
to support its determination. 53
After analyzing these flaws, this section argues that states are not help-
less in shielding their citizens from unwanted telemarketing. Other tools dis-
cussed in Rowan154 and the Stenehjem dissent strike a reasonable balance
between protecting residential privacy while honoring charities' free speech
rights.
A. Content-based
First, it is arguable that the North Dakota regulation is content-based.
Specifically, while the act allows charities to use an "outside agency" to call
residents and to advocate the charity's message, it prevents that agency from
requesting donations. 155 This restriction undermines the state's justification
for the regulation, because these "outside agencies" can make the same
amount of calls, as long as they do not ask for money. This provision also
highlights an interesting paradox. Under the statute, it is perfectly acceptable
for an agency to call residents who are registered with a "do not call" list and
say, "I am calling on behalf of the American Cancer Society, and I would like
to encourage you to refrain from smoking." However, if the caller goes one
step further and asks, "Would you like to help our cause with a donation?,"
the agency has just violated the North Dakota statute.
As previously discussed, Schaumburg describes charitable solicitation as
encompassing a variety of speech interests. 156 Therefore, it appears that the
statute regulates the very content of the charities' speech, because it prevents
them from exercising one of their speech interests, without providing an ade-
quate justification for distinguishing between solicitation and mere advocacy.
In Kokinda,157 for example, the postal service distinction was based on the
153. See supra notes 147-49.
154. See supra notes 32-34.
155. See Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591,
595 (8th Cir. 2005).
156. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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emotions and potential for conflicts that would block customers' means of
access.158 On the other hand, in Stenehjem, North Dakota argued that the stat-
ute was justified, because it reduced the "sheer volume" of calls made on
charities' behalf, which is much different than justifying the statute, because
asking for money is more intrusive than simply advocating a message.
The Supreme Court has been receptive to an analogous argument. In Ri-
ley, the Supreme Court noted that the disclosure provisions compelled state-
ments that otherwise might not be made. 159 Because this compulsion altered
the charity's message, the Court found the regulation to be content-based.
16 °
Of course, there are differences between the Riley statute and the Stenehjem
statute. Riley directly altered the charity's message, whereas Stenehjem's
alteration is indirect. As previously mentioned, it is unclear how the Supreme
Court will resolve this content-based question, although a clear statement on
these issues is necessary to give legislatures and courts more guidance in
crafting and interpreting statutes.
B. Standard of Review
The problem of determining the appropriate standard of review for
charitable solicitation regulations began in Schaumburg. There, the Court
noted that charitable solicitation was not simply "a variety of purely commer-
cial speech," because it involved several speech interests, such as promulgat-
ing the charity's views, disseminating information, and advocating for a
charitable cause. 161 Because of these factors, the Court characterized charita-
ble solicitation as being protected by the First Amendment. 162 Such a conclu-
sion necessarily elevates charitable solicitation above various forms of disfa-
vored speech, 163 entitling it to more protection from government regulation.
Curiously, however, the Court did not declare a standard of review. 164 In-
stead, they hedged their language by declaring that the ordinance at issue
could not "survive scrutiny under the First Amendment."1
65
This hedge has only spawned more confusion in determining the appro-
priate standard of review. In Riley, the Court stated that, because the disclo-
sure regulation at issue burdened protected speech, it would apply an "exact-
158. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. Also, as previously men-
tioned, Kokinda does not represent controlling legal reasoning because there was no
majority opinion. See supra note 96.
159. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988).
160. Id.
161. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
162. Id. at 633.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
164. See supra note 54.
165. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
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ing First Amendment scrutiny."' 166 Pryor, an Eighth Circuit case, echoed the
Supreme Court's struggle by noting that charitable solicitation is "fully pro-
tected" by the First Amendment, and noting that the regulation at issue could
only be upheld "if it withstands First Amendment scrutiny."'
' 67
Stenehjem claimed to make sense of this mess by looking back to
Schaumburg, which claimed to have outlined the appropriate test. 168 The
Stenehjem court then resolved any prior uncertainty by stating that although
"the Supreme Court has not specified whether the Schaumburg test is an in-
termediate scrutiny review of a content-neutral regulation, we have inter-
preted it as such." 16 9 Interestingly, the court cited to Pryor, where the court
had simply mirrored the ambiguous language of Schaumburg.
170
The Eighth Circuit compounded this confusion by failing to apply in-
termediate scrutiny. In considering whether the North Dakota statute was
narrowly tailored, the court determined that the goal of preserving residential
privacy "would be achieved less effectively" if charities were allowed to use
professional solicitors. 171 North Dakota argued that its distinction was based
upon the sheer volume of calls because a "charity using paid professional
telemarketers" would typically be "able to dial substantially more residential
telephone numbers than if the charity used its own volunteers and employ-
ees."'172 While this may be true, it is mere speculation. As the dissent pointed
out, North Dakota "provided no statistics to support its assertion.' 73 Evi-
dently, the majority was not concerned with this lack of statistical support,
though, because it upheld the distinction and refused to "second-guess the
North Dakota Legislature's judgment." 174 Ultimately, despite failing to men-
tion its standard of review, the court applied a rational basis standard of re-
view.
This level of cursory review would affirm virtually any reasonable dis-
tinction the government claimed to reduce the total number of solicitations.
For instance, the 75% limitation on door-to-door solicitation in Schaumburg
would surely reduce the total number of solicitors. Furthermore, organiza-
tions spending less than 75% of their soliciting proceeds on their organiza-
tion's message will have more money to pay employees to solicit around the
neighborhood, thus knocking on more doors and intruding more onto residen-
166. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988)
(applying this measure of scrutiny because the disclosure provisions amounted to
compelled speech).
167. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Ark. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
168. Fraternal Order of Police, N.D. State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597
(8th Cir. 2005).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see supra notes 54, 106-107 and accompanying text.
171. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 598.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 601 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
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tial privacy. Under Stenehjem's standard of review, this argument would pre-
vail because of the court's reluctance to "second-guess" the government.
Instead, applying any level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny
would require the court to examine the relationship between the regulation
and the state's interest. In Stenehjem, the question should have been whether
professional solicitors' calls were particularly intrusive to residential privacy
to justify regulating them but not volunteer solicitors. In fact, Schaumburg
even recognized the possibility that the opposite is true. In its opinion, the
court noted that "solicitation by organizations employing paid solicitors care-
fully screened in advance may be even less of a threat to public safety than
solicitation by organizations using volunteers." 175 Although the regulation
will likely reduce the total number of phone calls to North Dakota residents,
nearly any regulation of charitable solicitation would do that if courts accept
the "sheer volume" justification. 176 For example, the total number of calls
could also be reduced by only exempting charities that advocate health-
related issues, such as the American Cancer Society or the Red Cross but
restricting all other charities, such as the Salvation Army. Upholding this
distinction would be ridiculous, however, because both types of charities
intrude onto residential privacy to some degree and accepting the "sheer vol-
ume" argument gives the legislature too much latitude to make arbitrary dis-
tinctions.
C. Protecting Residential Privacy
Striking the appropriate balance between First Amendment freedom to
solicit and residential privacy may be a daunting task, but states are not with-
out the power to protect their citizens, and citizens are not without a remedy
against unwanted callers. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has
upheld sender-specific prohibitions on unwanted mailings in Rowan v. United
States Post Office Department.177 A possible formulation of a Rowan-like "no
call list" would allow residents to contact a state agency to report that they
have been receiving unwanted charitable calls on behalf of a specific charity.
For example, Missouri residents could contact the Public Service Commis-
sion,178 who would then examine the residents' complaint to determine its
merits and issue an order prohibiting the charity from contacting that number
again. 179 States can use different criteria for determining what warrants an
175. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 638 n.13
(1980).
176. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 598.
177. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
178. The Missouri Public Service Commission currently regulates telephone utili-
ties, MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-30.010 to -30.060 (2003); telecommunica-
tions service, id. § 240-32.010 to -32.200 (2004); and service and billing practices for
telecommunications companies, id. § 240-33.010 to -33.160 (2005).
179. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970)
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administrative order, such as the frequency of the calls, and an appropriate
enforcement mechanism, such as increasing fines for the violating charity.
Adopting a similar approach to handle unwanted charitable solicitation
calls would circumvent the appellee's arguments against the statute in
Stenehjem, while still preserving residential privacy. The Rowan-like regula-
tion would not be underinclusive, because it would target all charitable calls
that intrude on residential privacy, as determined by the residents themselves.
The regulatory scheme would also not be overinclusive, because it would
target only those charitable calls intruding on residential privacy and would
not "burden more speech than is necessary to further the State's interest in
residential privacy."'8 It is also important to note that under a Rowan-like
scheme, the residents themselves declare what disrupts their residential pri-
vacy, as opposed to a legislature trying to determine and effectively regulate
the most intrusive probes into residential privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although striking an appropriate balance between protecting residential
privacy and First Amendment rights is a difficult task, it seems that the
Eighth Circuit reached the wrong conclusion. If its reasoning were accepted,
particularly the "sheer volume" argument, the scales would be tipped too far
in favor of residential privacy. This would impinge charities' First Amend-
ment rights because of general public frustration with telemarketing. A better
approach would adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rowan and imple-
ment a caller-specific do not call list. Such an approach would strike a fairer
balance between residential privacy and First Amendment rights, because it
would regulate charities that actually intrude on residential privacy, while
allowing non-intrusive charities to fully exercise their First Amendment
rights. Without further clarification, however, state laws regulating charitable
solicitation will continue to be reviewed by courts mired in confusion about
how to appropriately balance residential privacy and First Amendment free-
doms.
MARCUS WILBERS
(Subsection (b) mandates the Postmaster General, upon receipt of a notice from
the addressee specifying that he has received advertisements found by him to be
within the statutory category, to issue on the addressee's request an order direct-
ing the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain from further mailings to the
named addressee. Additionally, subsection (c) requires the Postmaster General to
order the affected sender to delete the name of the designated addressee from all
mailing lists owned or controlled by the sender and prohibits the sale, rental,
exchange, or other transactions involving mailing lists bearing the name of the
designated addressee.).
180. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 598.
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